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Abstract 
 
The study investigates whether development assistance can be used to crowd-out the negative 
effect of terrorism on international trade. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 78 
developing countries for the period 1984-2008 and Quantile Regressions. The following main 
findings are established.  First, bilateral aid significantly reduces the negative effect of 
transnational terrorism on trade in the top quantiles of the trade distribution. Second, 
multilateral aid also significantly mitigates the negative effect of terrorism dynamics on trade 
in the top quantiles of the trade distributions. It follows that it is primarily in countries with 
above median levels of international trade that development assistance can be used as an 
effective policy tool for dampening the adverse effects of terrorism on trade. Practical 
implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
Terrorism represents one the most challenging contemporary policy syndromes to shared 
global prosperity. The trade channel is one of the mechanisms via which the scourge affects 
cross-country development (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). Against this backdrop, a 
growing body of literature has focused on investigating tools with which conflicts and 
terrorism can be attenuated (if not eradicated). Some of the documented mechanisms have 
encompassed, channels of: education (Brockhoff et al., 2014), especially lifelong learning 
(Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b) and bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008); the rule of law (Choi, 
2010); the appealing role of the media and freedom of the press (Hoffman et al., 2013); 
behavourial motivations underpinning terrorism (Gardner, 2007) and employment of military 
devices (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010; Asongu & Amankwah-Amoah, 2018; Asongu et al., 
2019). 
 The positioning of the inquiry on linkages between trade, foreign aid and terrorism 
builds on a gap in the stream of literature on nexuses between terrorism and macroeconomic 
outcomes. We substantiate this perspective in what follows by first discussing the underlying 
linkages and then engaging the more specific literature on the trade-terrorism nexus.   
 A substantial body of literature has been devoted to understand linkages between 
crimes, violence, terrorism, political instability and macroeconomic outcomes. Such focus has 
included the following. (i) The incidence of terrorism on foreign direct investment (FDI) (see 
Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008) and the relevance of foreign aid in dampening the impact of 
terrorism on FDI (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014). Sometimes the interaction is conditioned on 
FDI thresholds (see Asongu et al., 2015) and on domestic corruption-control levels (Efobi et 
al., 2015).  (ii) The relationship between acts of terror and economic growth, with evidence of 
bidirectional (Gries et al., 2011; Shahbaz et al., 2013;  Shahzad et al., 2015) as well as 
unidirectional (Piazza, 2006; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009;  Öcal & Yildirim,   2010; 
Meierrieks & Gries,  2013; Choi, 2015) causalities. (iii)  The nexus between innovation and 
terrorism (see Koh, 2007). (iv) How terrorism interplays with natural resources (see 
Humphreys, 2005).  
 The focus of this inquiry is on the last (iv) and first (i) strands. Hence, we aim to 
investigate if foreign aid can dampen the incidence of terrorism on international trade. While 
the link to the first strand reflects the notion of using external flows to crowd-out the effect of 
terrorism on globalisation, the connection to the last strand is fundamentally based on the fact 
that international trade encompasses the export of natural resources. We discuss how the 
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positioning of the inquiry steers clear of existing literature on the relationship between trade 
and terrorism, which can be discussed in three main themes, notably: the effect of terrorism 
on trade; the impact of illegal trade on terrorism and setbacks on the modelling of the nexus 
between terrorism and trade. The themes are engaged chronologically.  
  As far as I have reviewed, there are four main studies in the first theme which is 
oriented towards the incidence of terrorism on trade. (1) Richardson (2004) has concluded 
that measures of security that were put in place after the 2001 September 11 attacks in the 
USA broadly align with mitigating the negative consequences of terrorism on international 
trade. (2) The effect of welfare and terrorism on trade has been investigated by Nitsch and 
Schumacher (2004) who have employed an augmented gravity estimation approach on 200 
countries for the period 1960-1993. With the help of a multitude of terrorism, violence and 
bilateral trade indicators, they have reached the conclusion that terrorism affects trade 
openness negatively. Furthermore, they have also maintained that trade openness reduces by 
about four percent when terrorism incidents are doubled.  (3) De Sousa et al. (2009a) have 
examined the link between “nearness to the source of terror” and the unappealing 
consequences on trade. The authors have documented that it is imperative to carefully 
establish a theory that elucidate nexuses between transnational terrorism, trade and security 
policies. They have also emphasised the relevance of establishing more robust assessments on 
the spillovers of terrorism to varying definitions of neighbouring effects. (4) In an extension, 
De Sousa et al. (2009b) have investigated the impact of the diffusion of international 
terrorism on security and trade. The study is motivated by the hypothesis that closeness to the 
origin of terror is negatively connected to the corresponding spillover impacts. The underlying 
motivation of the study is that security initiatives that influence trade have a simultaneous 
incidence in the source-country and neighbouring nations. On the contrary, nations that are 
located very far from the origin of terror could be positively affected in terms of trade benefits 
which correspond to the “loss of trade” by the country from which the terror originates. 
Moreover, its immediate neighbours also experience negative trade effects as a result of the 
underlying terrorism.   De Sousa and co-authors have established three main results, notably: 
(i) the existence of a direct negative impact on trade from transnational terrorism; (ii) trade 
activities increase in the presence of terror remoteness and (iii) a negative impact of terror has 
spillovers beyond the source country of terror to neighbouring countries.  
 With regard to the second theme on the effect of illegal trade on terrorism, two studies 
are apparent in the sparse literature. On the one hand, Piazza (2011) has investigated the 
5 
 
relationship between terrorism and “trade in drugs” to conclude that the production of 
cocaine, opiate and illicit drugs substantially boost both domestic and transnational terror 
activities. Moreover, banning drugs and eradicating illicit crops produce opposite effects. On 
the other hand, using binomial regressions, Piazza (2012) has assessed the nexus between 
trade in opium and terrorism for the period 1996-2008 in thirty-four provinces in Afghanistan. 
The study establishes that high rates of terrorism are associated with Afghan provinces in 
which the cultivation of opium is relatively more important. The direction of causality is 
therefore established to flow from opium production to terrorism.  
 As concerns the third theme, concerns about modelling has been raised by Mirza and 
Verdier (2008) after a review of existing literature. The authors have documented four main 
pitfalls in the literature on the relationship between terrorism and trade. They have cautioned 
that in order to improve robustness in the underlying relationship, studies  have to: (i) account 
for omitted variables; (ii) acknowledge that terrorism is inter-temporally persistent; (iii) 
distinguish the impact of incidental country-specific terrorism impacts from the effect of 
occurrences that are related to source-nations and (iv) control for endogeneity.  
 The positioning of this inquiry improves the engaged literature in three main areas, 
namely by: controlling for more indicators of terrorism; exploring the relevance of foreign 
policy dynamics in the terrorism-trade nexus and adopting an empirical approach that controls 
for existing levels of the outcome indicator. The three points are substantiated in the 
paragraphs that follow. 
 First, in accordance with Choi (2015), it is important to control for more indicators 
when assessing the nexus between terrorism macroeconomic outcomes. Hence, this study 
considers four measurements of terrorism in order to avail room for more policy options. The 
adopted variables include: domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism, unclear terrorism and 
total terrorism. The adoption of multiple terrorism variables steers clear of the engaged trade-
terrorism studies in the perspectives that only few terrorism indicators have been used in the 
underlying literature, notably: domestic and transnational terrorism on the one hand by Piazza 
(2011) and transnational terrorism by De Sousa et al. (2009a, 2009b), on the other.  
 Second, in the interest of availing more room for policy implications, a policy variable 
is adopted in the terrorism-trade relationship. Accordingly, we assess how foreign aid can be 
used to dampen the negative relationship of terrorism with international trade. Two 
development assistance variables are employed, namely: bilateral aid and multilateral aid. The 
employment of a policy variable is in accordance with literature on the relevance of aid in the 
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terrorism-FDI relationship (see Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015).  The 
adoption of a policy variable has been cautioned by Choi (2015) and the intuition of a 
potentially negative influence of terrorism on trade is consistent with the findings of 
Richardson (2004) and De Sousa et al. (2009a, 2009b).   
Third, in the light of the caution expressed by Mirza and Verdier (2008) on the 
imperative to use more robust estimation techniques, we adopt an empirical strategy that 
controls for initial levels of trade. The adoption of the quantile regression approach which 
enables us to account for existing levels of international trade is motivated by the fact that, 
blanket aid-related policies aimed at curbing the negative consequences of terrorism on 
international trade, may be ineffective unless such policies are contingent on initial levels of 
trade and tailored differently across countries with high, intermediate and low existing trade 
levels.  
 The rest of the study is organised as follows. The theoretical underpinnings, world 
trade and corresponding theoretical strategies are discussed in Section 2.  Section 3 covers the 
data and methodology. The empirical results and corresponding discussion are engaged in 
Section 4 while Section 5 concludes with future research directions.  
 
2. Stylized facts and theoretical underpinnings   
2. 1 Stylized facts and conflict management theoretical insights   
 Terrorism is increasingly very costly to the average tax payer in the world. In 
accordance with Anderson (2015) from the 2014 Global Peace Index (GPI) report, 
approximately 13% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is lost to curtailing    violence, 
terrorism and political instability around the world. The report maintains that the 
corresponding government expenditure of 14.3 trillion USD is equivalent to the   combined 
GDP of some developed world economic powers, namely:  Canada, Brazil, France, Germany, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. By the same estimates, the underlying expenditure (which is 
largely allocated to preventing and fighting terrorism) is likely to increase in the coming years 
because terrorism activities have been growing both in scale and scope. For instance, 
compared to 2008, in 2014, terrorism activities represented a sixty-one percent rise in killings.   
Whereas developed countries are more equipped with the financial and logistical 
facilities with which to absorb the consequences of terrorism on macroeconomic outcomes, 
developing countries need development assistance from the international community in order 
to limit/assuage the negative economic consequences of terrorism.  Consistent with the 
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motivation in the introduction, the relevance of foreign aid in reducing the potentially 
negative effect of terrorism on trade represents an important gap in the literature. In what 
follows, we discuss the theoretical insights supporting the underlying linkages. This is also in 
accordance with a recommendation by De Sousa et al. (2009a) on the imperative of clearly 
documenting theoretical concepts motivating relationships to be investigated.  
 In accordance with the extant literature on terrorism (see Asongu et al., 2015; Efobi et 
al., 2015), there are two main theories substantiated by Akinwale (2010) which support this 
line of inquiry, notably: the Conflict Management Model (CMM) of Thomas-Kilman (1992) 
and the Social Control Theory (SCT) of Black (1990).  On the one hand, within the CMM 
framework, intentions that are strategic in nature are very likely to rotate around a matrix 
defined by two factors (of cooperation and assertiveness), which when combined with 
collaboration yields five fundamental conflict management styles, namely: accommodation, 
competition, collaboration, compromise and avoidance. On the other hand, with regards to the 
SCT, nexuses between individuals, organisations and groups affect the exercise of one of the 
five principal mechanisms of social control, namely: avoidance, negotiation, tolerance, self-
help and settlement.  The suggested theoretical underpinnings are in line with the literature on 
peace and conflict management (see Borg, 1992; Volkema & Bergmann, 1995; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016b). Furthermore, foreign aid is relevant in boosting factors needed in the 
fight against terrorism, notably: education and institutional quality (Heyneman, 2002; 
Heyneman, 2008a, 2008b; Beets, 2005; Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009;) and enhancement of 
government expenditure (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009).  
 It is important to articulate why foreign aid might modulate the effect of terrorism on 
trade on the one hand and the why it might vary according to the quantile of unexplained trade 
on the other hand. First, foreign aid might reduce the potentially negative effect of terrorism 
on trade because it provides financial, technical and logistical mechanisms with which to fight 
and prevent terrorism. The narrative on the relevance of foreign aid in boosting government 
expenditure and reducing the potentially negative effect of terrorism on macroeconomic 
outcomes is consistent with recent empirical literature (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009; 
Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015). Second, from logic and common sense, 
terrorism is likely to affect more globalised countries differently from their less globalised 
counterparts. In essence, terrorists’ activities targeting trade activities will naturally not affect 
countries with high trade intensity with the same magnitude as their counterparts of low trade 
intensity.  
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2.2 Word trade and strategy: intuition and theoretical highlights  
  
 A multitude of international trade approaches can be adopted by both governments and 
managers of trade companies in order to limit the negative effects of terrorism on the cost of 
trading.   In accordance with Mazzarella (2005), we organise this section into two principal 
categories, notably: (i) identification of the cost of terrorism on international trade and (ii) 
management of risks related to terrorism. The categories are expanded in what follows.  
 There are four main perspectives on the potential cost of terrorism in international 
trade, notably: (i) enhancement of  the physical security of personnel, equipment and plant; 
(ii) improvement of global supply chains and security in the transport of goods and services as 
well as risks that are associated with the disruption of sources of global supply; (iii) political 
risk insurance; (iv) hiring of security consultants and (v) reduction of direct investment and 
operations in high-risk areas.  
 Two perspectives are worth articulating on the second point, namely: methods of 
managing terrorism and risk modelling. On the one hand, cost minimisation of terrorism is 
contingent on the effectiveness of risk modelling approaches. The main contemporary 
practice for most managers of international trade companies consists of estimating loses of the 
future with computer-based risk modelling approaches which employ physical security 
analysis as inputs in order to determine potential damages and corresponding probability of 
attacks. Managers of international trade are ultimately informed about the levels of terrorism 
linked to the coverage of risk insurance that is essential for a specific business operation. On 
the other hand, various management methods for terrorism exist. These are adopted by 
managers in order to, inter alia: consolidate physical assets and work sites; hire more security 
personnel and consultants; employ subcontractors to mitigate further risk; train more 
personnel to prevent being terrorism targets and ensure good environmental and human rights 
records.  
 The discussed theoretical framework is in line with contemporary literature on 
international trade with regards to measures of the addressing negative effects resulting from 
terrorism, notably: anticipation of the potential impacts of terrorism (Harvey et al., 2017), 
management of individuals in hostile terrains (Barder et al., 2015), especially in relation to 
expatriate personnel (Barder & Berg, 2014a; Barder & Berg, 2014b; Bader et al., 2016) and 
Corporate Social Responsibility by international trade companies as a strategic management 
tool (Agwu & Taylor, 2015).  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
A panel of 78 developing countries is investigated. The data is for the period 1984-2008. The 
sample which consists of three-year non-overlapping intervals is from Bandyopadhyay et al. 
(2014),  Asongu and Ssozi (2017) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2018)1. The variables are 
originally from three main sources, namely: (i) World Development Indicators of the World 
Bank; (ii) the Global Terrorism Database, (iii) terrorism incidents from Gailbulloev et al. 
(2012) and Enders et al. (2011).  
There are three main justifications for the choice of the sample and periodicity. First 
and foremost, consistent with Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009), compared to developed 
countries, the negative macroeconomic externalities of terrorism are more apparent in 
developing countries. This is for the most part because accordingly to Gaibulloev and Sandler 
(2009), developing nations lack the technological, logical and financial mechanisms that are 
essential for absorbing negative consequences related to terrorism. Second, development 
assistance is channelled from developed to developing countries. Hence, the analytical scope 
should not be on the former set of countries. Third, the present inquiry also aims to compare 
corresponding results with the stream of FDI literature that is based on the same sample and 
periodicity (see Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015). 
The dependent variable is trade exports while the independent variables of interest are: 
(i) terrorism variables (transnational, unclear, domestic, unclear and total terrorisms) and (ii) 
foreign aid indicators (bilateral and multilateral aids). Terrorism is defined in this study as the 
threatened and actual use of force by subnational actors with the aim of employing 
intimidation to achieve political objectives (Enders & Sandler, 2006). The terrorism indicators 
measure the number of yearly terrorism incidents registered in a country. In order to avoid 
mathematical concerns that are related to log-transforming zeros and correct the positive skew 
in the data, the study considers the natural logarithm of terrorism incidents by adding one to 
the base. This transformation approach is in accordance with recent literature (Choi & 
                                                          
1
 The adopted countries include: “Albania, Costa Rica, India, Namibia, Syria, Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, 
Nicaragua, Tanzania, Angola, Dominican Republic, Iran, Niger, Thailand, Argentina, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, 
Togo, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh,  El Salvador, Kenya, Panama, 
Tunisia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Paraguay, Uganda, 
Brazil, Gambia, Madagascar, Peru, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Philippines, Venezuela, Cameroon, 
Guatemala, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Chile, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Yemen, China, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malta, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Colombia, Guyana ,Mexico, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Congo, D. Republic, Haiti, 
Morocco, Sri Lanka, Congo Republic, Honduras, Mozambique and Sudan”. 
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Salehyan, 2013; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Asongu et al., 2017, 2018a, 2018b; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017). Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). 
Domestic terrorism “includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involve[s] the nationals 
of the venue country: implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters 
are all from the venue country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is “ terrorism including those 
acts of terrorism that concern[s] at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, 
supporters and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from 
another”.  Unclear terrorism is that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can 
neither be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum 
of domestic, transnational and unclear terrorisms.  
Control variables are also adopted by the study in order to ascertain whether some pre-
established relationships with the outcome variable are apparent. The macroeconomic and 
institutional variables of control include:  internal conflicts, political globalisation, exchange 
rate, infrastructure, inflation and GDP growth.  We discuss anticipated signs.   
(1) Improvements in exchange rates should positively affect trade from the perspective of 
exports (see Akpan, 2015; Asongu, 2015), whereas inflation and civil conflicts intuitively 
have the opposite effects. In essence: (i) inflation is likely to decrease trade because investors 
have been documented to prefer doing business in economic environments that are less 
ambiguous (see Kelsey & le Roux, 2017, 2018); (ii) high exchange rate in developing 
countries are associated with low levels of exports (Rodrik, 2008) and (iii) trade logically 
does not thrive in an economic environment that is clouded with civil conflicts and political 
instability.  
(2) GDP growth and infrastructure should stimulate trade whereas the effect of political 
globalisation should be negative. (i) The impact of GDP growth is intuitively positive because 
economic prosperity is associated with opportunities of investment and trade. (ii) Good 
infrastructure also facilitates investment and trade domestically. (iii) The anticipated effect of 
political globalisation is negative because developing countries are more concerned with the 
socio-economic effects of globalisation, contrary to advanced countries that are concerned 
with leadership roles in processes of the international ‘decision-making’ (Lalountas et al., 
2011; Asongu, 2014).  
 Table 1 provides definitions and sources of the discussed variables. Table 2 presents 
the summary statistics of the indicators while the corresponding correlation matrix is provided 
in Appendix 3. The purpose of the summary statistics is to ascertain two main concerns. On 
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the one hand, based on mean values, the variables are comparable. On the other hand, from 
the standard deviations, we can be confident that reasonable estimated linkages would 
emerge. The objective of the correlation matrix is to control for potential multicollinearity 
concerns between non-interactive indicators. In essence, in interactive models, whereas the 
issue of multicollinearity is not relevant for interactive variables (terrorism and foreign aid), 
the concern is important for non-interactive variables as in linear additive models (Brambor et 
al., 2006).  
 
Table 1: Definition and source of variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions Sources 
    
GDP growth  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) 
and Efobi et al. 
(2015) 
   
Trade Openness  LnTrade Ln. of Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) 
   
Infrastructure  LnTel  Ln. of Number of Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
   
Inflation  LnInflation Ln. of Consumer Price Index (% of annual) 
   
Exchange rate LnXrate  Ln. of  Exchange rate (local currency per USD) 
   
Bilateral Aid  LnBilaid Ln. of Bilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Multilateral Aid  LnMulaid Ln. of Multilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Total Aid  LnTotaid Ln. of Total aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Domestic terrorism Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents 
   
Transnational 
terrorism 
Tranater Number of Transnational terrorism incidents 
 
   
Unclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents  
   
Political 
globalisation 
LnPolglob  Ln. of  Index of political globalisation  
   
Internal conflicts  Civcon Index of  internal civil conflicts  
    
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators. Ln: logarithm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
GDP growth 3.852 3.467 -10.933 17.339 612 
      
Trade Openness (ln) 4.118 0.534 2.519 5.546 612 
      
Infrastructure (ln) 1.475 1.017 0.091 4.031 616 
      
Inflation (ln) 2.414 1.384 -3.434 9.136 581 
      
Exchange rate (ln) 2.908 3.870 -22.121 21.529 618 
      
Bilateral Aid (ln) 5.181 1.286 0.765 8.362 602 
      
Multilateral Aid (ln) 4.163 1.518 -1.249 7.105 600 
      
Total Aid (ln) 5.550 1.276 0.800 8.495 608 
      
Domestic terrorism 14.292 45.179 0 419.33 624 
      
Transnational terrorism 2.316 6.127 0 63 624 
      
Unclear terrorism 1.972 7.479 0 86 624 
      
Total terrorism 18.581 55.595 0 477.66 624 
      
Political globalisation (ln) 4.036 0.301 2.861 4.530 624 
      
Internal conflicts 0.965 1.906 0 10 615 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations. Ln: logarithm.  
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   Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
               
GDPg LnTrade LnTel LnInflation LnXrate LnBilad LnMulaid LnTotaid Domter Tranater Unclter Totter LnPolglob Civcon  
1.000 0.089 0.065 -0.236 0.112 0.195 0.178 0.227 -0.058 -0.021 -0.042 -0.055 0.117 -0.010 GDPg 
 -0.309 0.450 -0.025 -0.095 0.230 -0.002 0.172 0.205 0.207 0.184 0.213 0.525 0.191 LnRGDP 
 -0.106 0.095 0.016 -0.002 0.230 -0.090 -0.007 0.044 0.066 0.013 0.044 0.207 0.043 LnFuelExp 
 0.103 0.080 -0.001 -0.055 0.126 0.025 0.093 0.049 0.0007 -0.001 0.040 0.109 -0.079 LnOIExp 
 1.000 0.296 -0.230 0.043 -0.267 -0.289 -0.282 -0.236 -0.206 -0.240 -0.246 -0.122 -0.299 LnTrade 
  1.000 -0.121 -0.191 -0.376 -0.514 -0.450 0.023 0.072 -0.003 0.026 0.268 -0.183 LnTel 
   1.000 -0.284 -0.047 -0.023 -0.039 0.171 0.164 0.091 0.169 -0.150 0.185 LnInflation 
    1.000 0.114 0.183 0.144 -0.081 -0.001 -0.050 -0.073 0.089 -0.120 LnXrate 
     1.000 0.721 0.970 0.116 0.088 0.093 0.117 0.233 0.259 LnBilaid 
      1.000 0.833 0.014 -0.039 0.069 0.016 0.167 0.194 LnMulaid 
       1.000 0.093 0.059 0.094 0.094 0.227 0.255 LnTotaid 
        1.000 0.743 0.733 0.993 0.127 0.428 Domter 
         1.000 0.528 0.785 0.120 0.418 Tranater 
          1.000 0.789 0.072 0.347 Unclter 
           1.000 0.126 0.441 Totter 
            1.000 -0.024 LnPolglob 
             1.000 Civcon 
               
GDPg: GDP growth rate.  LnTrade: Trade Openness.  LnTel: Number of Telephone lines. LnXrate: Exchange rate.  LnBilaid: Bilateral aid. LnMulaid: Multilater aid.  LnTotaid: Total aid.  
Domter: Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  Tranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. Unclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.  Totter: Total 
number of terrorism incidents.   LnPolglob: Index of political globalisation. Civcon:  Index of internal civil conflicts.   
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3.2 Methodology  
Consistent with the economic development literature on conditional determinants (see 
Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012), in order to examine how initial levels of 
trade openness affect the nexuses between terrorism, aid and trade; we use the quantile 
regression (QR) approach. The methodology consists of assessing the determinants of trade 
openness throughout the conditional distribution of trade openness (Keonker & Hallock, 
2001).  
While previous studies on the relationship between terrorism and macroeconomic 
outcomes have reported parameter estimates at the conditional mean of the macroeconomic 
variables (see Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015), we complement the underlying 
literature by using the QR strategy. In essence, whereas mean effects on the dependent 
variable are important, effects on the conditional distribution provide more space for policy 
implications. For instance, while Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assume that the outcome 
variable and error terms are distributed normally, such an assumption is not the basis for the  
QR approach. Hence, the empirical strategy enables the study to assess the impact of the 
‘underlying independent variables of interest’ on the outcome variable with particular 
emphasis on low- intermediate- and high-‘trade openness’ countries. Accordingly, with QR, 
parameter estimates are obtained at various points of the conditional distributions of ‘trade 
openness’ (Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Boateng et al., 2018).  
The  th quantile estimator of trade is obtained by solving the following optimization 
problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (1) for the purpose of simplicity and 
ease of presentation.   
    

  
 



 


ii
i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
  ,                                           (1) 
where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with the QR technique, we minimise the weighted sum of absolute 
deviations. For instance, the 50th quartile or 90th decile (with  =0.50 or 0.90 respectively) are 
estimated by approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of trade 
or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (2) 
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where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at 
the mean of the conditional distribution of trade. For the model in Eq. (2) the dependent 
variable iy  is the trade openness indicator while ix  contains a constant term, inflation, 
infrastructure, exchange rate, political globalisation and civil/internal conflicts.  
  
4. Empirical results  
Table 4 and Table 5 show results corresponding respectively to bilateral development 
assistance and multilateral development assistance.  All the tables embody four-sets of 
specifications, namely: (i) transnational and domestic terrorism modelling in Panel A and (ii) 
total and unclear terrorism estimations in Panel B.  Accordingly, the left-hand-side (LHS) of 
Panel A (B) shows findings for domestic (unclear) terrorism while the right-hide-side (RHS) 
of Panel A (B) displays findings for transnational (total) terrorism. In both tables, we 
consistently notice that the OLS estimates are different from QR estimates in terms of signs 
and significance. The substantial differences between OLS estimates and various quantiles 
further support the relevance of the adopted QR strategy. 
The following findings can be established with respect to Table 4 on linkages between 
trade openness, bilateral aid and terrorism indicators. First, bilateral aid significantly 
contributes to mitigate the negative effect of transnational terrorism on trade in the top 
quantiles of the trade distribution. Second, the effect of bilateral aid is not significant in 
dampening the potentially negative effects of domestic, unclear and total terrorism on trade 
openness. Third, most of the significant control variables display the expected signs.  
The following findings can be established with respect to Table 5 on linkages between 
trade openness, multilateral aid and terrorism indicators. First, multilateral aid significantly 
contributes to mitigate the negative effect of terrorism dynamics on trade in the top quantiles 
of the trade distributions. While this is the case at the 90th decile with regards to ‘domestic 
terrorism’- and ‘total terrorism’-related regressions, such a dampening impact is apparent in 
the 75th quartile and 90th decile of ‘transnational terrorism’ and ‘unclear terrorism’-related 
regressions. Second, the significant control variables display expected signs.  
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Table 4: Trade, Bilateral aid, Terrorism  
             
 Dependent Variable: Trade  (Ln) 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
 
    
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 5.558*** 4.138*** 5.448*** 5.871*** 5.944*** 5.974*** 5.657*** 4.217*** 5.477*** 5.547*** 5.908*** 5.981*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domter -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.0007 -0.002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.301) (0.726) (0.165) (0.297) (0.668) (0.166)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- -
0.036*** 
-0.019 -0.021 -0.030 -0.054** -
0.045*** 
       (0.008) (0.249) (0.212) (0.174) (0.020) (0.005) 
LnBilaid -
0.053*** 
-
0.096*** 
-
0.073*** 
-0.056* -0.029 -0.042 -
0.062*** 
-
0.103*** 
-
0.079*** 
-0.052* -0.041 -0.053* 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.223) (0.180) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) (0.107) (0.068) 
Domter  × LnBilaid 0.00009 0.0004 0.0004   0.0004 -0.0002 0.00002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.770) (0.574) (0.184) (0.441) (0.438) (0.946)       
Tranater × LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.005** 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.007* 0.004* 
       (0.045) (0.193) (0.206) (0.358) (0.086) (0.082) 
GDPg 0.010 0.034*** 0.022*** 0.009 -0.008 0.014 0.011 0.033*** 0.023*** 0.009 -0.00004 0.014 
 (0.174) (0.001) (0.000) (0.297) (0.336) (0.127) (0.137) (0.002) (0.000) (0.288) (0.996) (0.185) 
LnInflation -0.053** -
0.092*** 
-
0.059*** 
-
0.066*** 
-0.020 0.013 -0.051** -
0.089*** 
-
0.055*** 
-0.047** -0.018 0.010 
 (0.023) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.330) (0.587) (0.027) (0.006) (0.001) (0.038) (0.390) (0.685) 
LnInfrastructure  0.106*** 0.065 0.095*** 0.092** 0.154*** 0.221*** 0.111*** 0.062 0.103*** 0.093*** 0.159*** 0.237*** 
 (0.000) (0.132) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.167) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) 0.009 0.022*** 0.012** 0.005 -0.005 -0.016* 0.011 0.023*** 0.011** 0.013 -0.001 -0.013 
 (0.171) (0.008) (0.031) (0.517) (0.506) (0.056) (0.100) (0.009) (0.048) (0.108) (0.841) (0.109) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  -
0.298*** 
-0.029 -
0.320*** 
-
0.357*** 
-
0.353*** 
-
0.339*** 
-
0.316*** 
-0.040 -
0.325*** 
-
0.299*** 
-0.341*** -
0.331*** 
 (0.000) (0.784) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.772) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.004) 
Civil Conflicts  -
0.044*** 
-
0.089*** 
-
0.087*** 
-
0.057*** 
-0.019 0.012 -
0.049*** 
-
0.085*** 
-
0.091*** 
-
0.047*** 
-0.037** 0.022 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.194) (0.536) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.014) (0.257) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.207 0.191 0.148 0.113 0.120 0.163 0.209 0.196 0.151 0.116 0.114 0.149 
Fisher  15.67***      15.76***      
Observations  540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 5.584*** 3.911*** 5.325*** 5.832*** 5.886*** 5.745*** 5.548*** 4.116*** 5.372*** 5.783*** 5.901*** 6.025*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unclter  -0.001 0.003 0.003 .0004 -0.004 -
0.027*** 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.910) (0.858) (0.844) (0.746) (0.697) (0.009)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.002 
       (0.284) (0.512) (0.259) (0.492) (0.696) (0.177) 
LnBilaid -
0.050*** 
-
0.090*** 
-
0.064*** 
-0.052** -0.030 -0.039 -
0.053*** 
-
0.095*** 
-
0.070*** 
-0.052 -0.033 -0.048* 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.025) (0.241) (0.192) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.054) (0.174) (0.072) 
Unclter × LnBilaid -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.509) (0.710) (0.764) (0.364) (0.478) (0.359)       
Totter × LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.00007   0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.00003 
       (0.792) (0.446) (0.308) (0.816) (0.353) (0.909) 
GDPg 0.009 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.007 -0.004 0.014 0.010 0.034*** 0.023*** 0.009 -0.005 0.014 
 (0.182) (0.002) (0.001) (0.324) (0.562) (0.126) (0.180) (0.006) (0.000) (0.240) (0.500) (0.126) 
LnInflation -0.057** -
0.087*** 
-
0.053*** 
-
0.066*** 
-0.029 0.012 -0.052 -0.091** -
0.051*** 
-
0.058*** 
-0.013 0.018 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.157) (0.614) (0.024) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.521) (0.448) 
LnInfrastructure  0.106*** 0.058 0.101*** 0.091*** 0.135*** 0.216*** 0.108*** 0.065 0.105*** 0.085** 0.148*** 0.229*** 
 (0.000) (0.190) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.168) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) 0.009 0.025*** 0.008 0.009 -0.007 -0.013 0.009 0.023** 0.012** 0.008 -0.008 -0.015** 
 (0.174) (0.004) (0.185) (0.195) (0.329) (0.109) (0.161) (0.014) (0.040) (0.282) (0.281) (0.040) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  -
0.305*** 
0.016 -
0.299*** 
-
0.353*** 
-
0.326*** 
-0.287** -
0.297*** 
-0.025 -
0.314*** 
-
0.344*** 
-0.337*** -
0.348*** 
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 (0.005) (0.881) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.014) (0.000) (0.825) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Civil Conflicts  -
0.042*** 
-
0.083*** 
-
0.085*** 
-
0.054*** 
-0.019 -0.004 -
0.042*** 
-
0.089*** 
-
0.088*** 
-
0.044*** 
-0.013 0.019 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.201) (0.819) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.358) (0.318) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.217 0.195 0.149 0.120 0.119 0.154 0.209 0.191 0.148 0.115 0.122 0.166 
Fisher  16.95***      16.32***      
Observations  540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bilaid: Bilateral aid.  GDPg: GDP growth rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. 
R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Trade is  least. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Trade, Multilateral aid, Terrorism 
             
 Dependent Variable: Trade (ln) 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
 
    
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 5.423*** 3.766*** 4.991*** 5.566*** 5.518*** 5.705*** 5.470*** 3.747*** 5.013*** 5.575*** 5.559*** 5.727*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domter -0.001** -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 -
0.002*** 
-
0.004*** 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.044) (0.501) (0.425) (0.317) (0.006) (0.000)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- -
0.017*** 
-0.012** -0.009 -0.016** -
0.025*** 
-0.033*** 
       (0.000) (0.011) (0.151) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnMulaid -
0.055*** 
-
0.097*** 
-0.057** -0.060** -0.051** -0.055* -
0.063*** 
-
0.116*** 
-0.059** -0.067*** -0.058** -0.058** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.014) (0.020) (0.017) (0.054) (0.001) (0.000) (0.014) (0.002) (0.012) (0.045) 
Domter × LnMulaid 0.00006 -0.0001 0.0002 0.00008 -0.00003 0.0003* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.793) (0.402) (0.561) (0.826) (0.886) (0.080)       
Tranater × LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.002 0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.003** 
       (0.116) (0.015) (0.327) (0.392) (0.013) (0.037) 
GDPg  0.011 0.032*** 0.018** 0.008 -0.005 0.017** 0.012 0.030*** 0.019** 0.007 0.002 0.017 
 (0.140) (0.001) (0.018) (0.291) (0.511) (0.036) (0.110) (0.001) (0.015) (0.252) (0.727) (0.107) 
LnInflation -0.049** -
0.089*** 
-0.054** -0.053** 0.0006 0.039* -0.048** -
0.088*** 
-0.050** -0.050*** -0.014 0.040 
 (0.037) (0.005) (0.022) (0.018) (0.972) (0.087) (0.045) (0.006) (0.036) (0.007) (0.470) (0.100) 
LnInfrastructure  0.087*** 0.017 0.087** 0.065* 0.116*** 0.225*** 0.089*** 0.001 0.088** 0.076** 0.128*** 0.230*** 
 (0.002) (0.635) (0.016) (0.088) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.963) (0.017) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) 0.010 0.030*** 0.011 0.010 -0.009 -0.011 0.013* 0.035*** 0.012 0.014** -0.0003 -0.009 
 (0.148) (0.000) (0.155) (0.205) (0.191) (0.164) (0.074) (0.000) (0.123) (0.047) (0.965) (0.212) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  -
0.272*** 
0.055 -0.236** -
0.294*** 
-0.228** -
0.289*** 
-
0.280*** 
0.077 -0.242** -0.295*** -0.241** -0.296*** 
 (0.001) (0.560 (0.014) (0.008) (0.022) (0.008) (0.000) (0.431) (0.010) (0.001) (0.020) (0.007) 
Civil Conflicts  -
0.046*** 
-
0.074*** 
-
0.087*** 
-
0.046*** 
-0.012 0.008 -
0.049*** 
-
0.072*** 
-
0.089*** 
-0.046*** -
0.040*** 
0.018 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.362) (0.616) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.309) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.201 0.198 0.145 0.111 0.116 0.158 0.202 0.198 0.147 0.115 0.107 0.150 
Fisher 14.35***      15.36***      
Observations  536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 
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 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism 
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 5.483*** 3.549*** 4.988*** 5.767*** 5.620*** 5.873*** 5.407*** 3.727*** 4.981*** 5.520*** 5.544*** 5.703*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unclter  -0.013** -0.003 -0.006 -0.013 -
0.030*** 
-
0.043*** 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.015) (0.536) (0.370) (0.117) (0.000) (0.000)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001** -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.001 -
0.002*** 
-0.003*** 
       (0.028) (0.533) (0.389) (0.210) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnMulaid -
0.050*** 
-
0.083*** 
-0.045** -0.050** -
0.049*** 
-0.054** -
0.054*** 
-
0.094*** 
-0.057** -0.062** -0.051** -0.055** 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.031) (0.018) (0.009) (0.035) (0.005) (0.000) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.043) 
Unclter × LnMulaid 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0008 0.001 0.003*** 0.005*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.554) (0.645) (0.607) (0.494) (0.000) (0.000)       
Totter × LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.00001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.00007 0.00001 0.0003** 
       (0.933) (0.386) (0.550) (0.787) (0.904) (0.049) 
GDPg 0.010 0.033** 0.014** 0.007 -0.0004 0.018** 0.011 0.032*** 0.018** 0.008 -0.0001 0.017** 
 (0.159) (0.000) (0.048) (0.271) (0.945) (0.020) (0.147) (0.001) (0.017) (0.314) (0.988) (0.030) 
LnInflation -0.052** -
0.081*** 
-0.052** -0.061* -0.006 0.026 -0.049** -
0.088*** 
-0.054** -0.053** 0.0006 0.042* 
 (0.024) (0.007) (0.016) (0.061) (0.697) (0.224) (0.038) (0.006) (0.020) (0.014) (0.972) (0.063) 
LnInfrastructure  0.091*** 0.023 0.092*** 0.073** 0.131** 0.228*** 0.088*** 0.019 0.088** 0.061* 0.115*** 0.227*** 
 (0.001) (0.510) (0.006) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.585) (0.013) (0.096) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) 0.010 0.030*** 0.011 0.009 -0.007 -0.011* 0.010 0.030*** 0.011 0.011 -0.007 -0.012 
 (0.144) (0.000) (0.118) (0.172) (0.211) (0.084) (0.140) (0.000) (0.134) (0.174) (0.259) (0.123) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  -
0.291*** 
0.085 -
0.246*** 
-
0.350*** 
-
0.263*** 
-
0.328*** 
-
0.270*** 
0.059 -0.234** -0.278*** -0.240** -0.291*** 
 (0.000) (0.348) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.528) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) 
Civil Conflicts  -
0.045*** 
-
0.070*** 
-
0.082*** 
-
0.052*** 
-0.023** 0.002 -
0.043*** 
-
0.074*** 
-
0.087*** 
-0.043*** -0.014 0.015 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.044) (0.872) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.265) (0.345) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.210 0.203 0.145 0.116 0.118 0.166 0.203 0.198 0.145 0.114 0.120 0.163 
Fisher 17.28***      15.08***      
Observations  536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mulaid: Multilateral aid. GDPg: GDP growth rate. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Trade is least. 
 
When the findings in Tables 4 and 5 are compared and contrasted, a common 
denominator is apparent: it is primarily in countries with above-median levels of international 
trade that development assistance can be used as an effective policy tool for dampening the 
negative effect of terrorism on trade. Moreover, the evidence of causality running from 
terrorism to international trade is consistent the extant literature on the role of terrorism on 
trade, notably: Richardson (2004), Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) and De Sousa et al. (2009a, 
2009b).  With respect to the role of foreign aid in modulating the effect of terrorism on trade, 
the established findings are consistent with the stream of literature underpinnings this study, 
notably:  the role of aid in the terrorism-FDI nexus (see  Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014;  Efobi 
et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2015). Briefly discussing how we have improved findings 
established in prior exposition is worthwhile. For instance it is relevant to note that Asongu et 
al. (2015) have used quantile regressions with a focus on FDI whereas the other two studies 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014;  Efobi et al., 2015) have also used Generalised Method of 
19 
 
Moments (GMM) with FDI as outcome variable. While the study by Bandyopadhyay et al. 
(2014) has been extended by Efobi et al. (2015) using a more robust GMM approach that 
conditions the investigated relationship on the level of corruption-control in developing 
countries, the two studies have also been extended by Asongu et al. (2015) who have assessed 
how foreign aid modulates the effect of terrorism on FDI throughout the conditional 
distributions of FDI.  
 
5. Concluding implications and further research directions  
 
The study has investigated whether development assistance can be used to crowd-out 
the negative effect of terrorism on international trade. The empirical evidence is based on a 
panel of 78 developing countries for the period 1984-2008 and Quantile Regressions. The 
following main findings have been established.  First, bilateral aid significantly mitigates the 
negative effect of transnational terrorism on trade in the top quantiles of the trade distribution. 
Second, multilateral aid also significantly reduces the negative effect of terrorism dynamics 
on trade in the top quantiles of the trade distributions. While this marginal effect from the 
interaction between multilateral aid and terrorism is apparent at the 90th decile with regards to 
‘domestic terrorism’- and ‘total terrorism’-related regressions, such dampening impact is 
apparent in the 75th quartile and 90th decile of ‘transnational terrorism’- and ‘unclear 
terrorism’-related regressions. It follows that it is primarily in countries above-median levels 
of international trade that development assistance can be used as an effective policy tool for 
dampening the negative effect of terrorism on trade.  
The established findings clarify Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) who have concluded 
that bilateral aid is more relevant at dampening the negative effects of total terrorism and 
domestic terrorism on iron ore exports. Hence, when trade is considered in the broad sense, 
the policy relevance of foreign aid is not restricted to the total and domestic dimensions 
terrorism. Moreover, within this broader spectrum, multilateral aid appears to be a better tool 
than bilateral development assistance. The findings are also consistent with Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) who have shown that foreign aid can be employed to dampen the adverse 
consequences of terrorism on FDI. It what follows we discuss managerial implications for 
international trade companies.  
In the light of established findings, in the absence of development assistance, 
corporate managers in countries with above median levels of trade openness need to take 
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preventive measures in view of reducing the potentially negative effect of terrorism on the 
cost of international trade. It is important to note that while foreign aid is largely allocated to 
governments of developing countries, the results also apply to managers of trading 
corporations in developing countries. At least five preventive steps or strategies can be 
adopted by managers of corporations involved in international trade. (i) Improvement in 
physical security should be considered in high risky places, notably for personnel, plant and 
equipments. (ii) The uncertainty linked with politically-risky investment environments can be 
reduced by insurance schemes subscriptions. (iii) Another measure that corporate managers 
can adopt is to reduce/avoid costs associated with investments in locations that are very likely 
to be impacted by terrorism. (iv) Security consultants usually provide very valuable 
information on economic and political risks linked to areas where international trade 
companies operate.  These insights are relevant for informed decision-making. (v) It is also 
important to enhance security in networks of transportation because global supply chains of 
international companies could be seriously compromised by terrorists’ attacks.  
Given the rise of terrorism incidents in recent years, future studies can focus on 
alternative policy tools that can be employed to crowd-out the adverse consequences of 
terrorism on macroeconomic outcomes. A caveat in this study is that foreign aid may be 
potentially endogenous to conflicts and trade. In other words, aid may be aimed at precisely 
those countries that fall into conflict but are nonetheless serious traders? This caveat is 
identified in this study in the perspective that the effectiveness of aid in modulating terrorism 
is more apparent in countries with above-median levels of international trade. Hence, future 
studies should account for such possible occurrences of endogeneity.  
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